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Abstract: 
Following the rapidly growing literature on the Neolithic revolution, I develop a model of 
mankind’s initial transition to agriculture in which population and technological sophistication are 
both endogenous variables. I assume that total factor productivity in both agriculture and hunting and 
gathering depend on natural resource endowments and a general purpose technology, but that TFP in 
agriculture is relatively more dependent on technological sophistication than TFP in hunting and 
gathering, and that agriculture requires effort be expended in land enclosure. The model describes 
combinations of population pressure, technological sophistication, and resource endowments that are 
sufficient to generate a switch to agriculture and enclosure, but also admits the possibility that no 
switch will occur. I estimate the steady-state relationships of the model by applying a two-state, two-
equation model with endogenous regime switching using information on the incidence of agriculture, 
population density, technology, and environment among 186 pre-modern societies. I find that habitat 
diversity, a relatively flat landscape, and exceptionally heavy rainfall are among factors contributing 
to total factor productivity in hunting and gathering, while soil quality, climate suitability and 
proximity to an ocean increase total factor productivity in agriculture. I also estimate that roughly ten 
percent of TFP in agriculture can be attributed to technological sophistication, while TFP in hunting 
and gathering is not influenced by technology. Among other things, I find evidence that endogenous 
growth effects may be responsible for approximately 40% of observed technological sophistication 












 The agricultural or “Neolithic” revolution – the process by which the peoples of the earth 
gradually switched from hunting and gathering to agriculture beginning some 10000 years ago – was 
certainly a defining event in human history. The agricultural revolution not only fundamentally 
altered the nature of human society, but also put in place the initial conditions necessary for 
development of the defining institutions of modern industrial society, such as centralized government 
and private property rights. I construct a model of the transition to agriculture that blends elements of 
endogenous growth theory, the theory of the land enclosure decision, and Malthusian population 
dynamics. Specifically, I expand on existing theory by 1) explicitly modeling the land enclosure 
process coincident with the transition to agriculture, 2) explicitly postulating differences in the way in 
which technological progress influences the relative productivity of agriculture and hunting and 
gathering, and 3) modeling the transition in such a way so that the base parameters of the model can 
be estimated using existing data. The result is both an extension of existing theory of the transition 
and important insights into the relative importance of various environmental conditions in driving a 
transition to agriculture, and the relative importance of endogenous growth effects in driving the 
transition.  
I proceed from the assumption that agriculture is a more knowledge-intensive activity than 
hunting and gathering, but also requires some investment in maintaining exclusive property rights. 
Following Kremer (1993), I also allow population density to influence the level of technological 
sophistication, and for Malthusian population dynamics. The result is a framework which describes 
combinations of technological progress, population pressure, and environmental conditions that lead 
to the adoption of agriculture. The model leads to an economy which eventually tends towards one of 
two mutually exclusive steady states. For some sets of initial conditions, agriculture never develops, 
private property rights over land never come to be defined, and the economy remains in a hunter-
gatherer state. For other initial conditions, the economy progresses from a hunter-gatherer economy to 
a point at which the enclosure process and the adoption of agriculture begin. After this point, a population explosion occurs, land enclosure steadily grows, and technological development proceeds. 
In this case, the economy grows towards a fully agricultural steady-state.  
The true strength of my theoretical construct is that it is readily applicable to existing data 
from known pre-modern societies. Using cross-sectional evidence from a varied yet representative 
sample of 186 known indigenous peoples around the world (the data set includes hunter-gatherers, 
peoples practicing subsistence agriculture, and nation-state cultures), I estimate the relationship 
between technological sophistication, population density, and the reliance on agriculture. I employ 
information about the degree of spillovers from other societies (measured by distance from the Fertile 
Crescent and the date at which the society first experienced contact with the west) to exactly identify 
the theoretical model.  The empirical results therefore provide qualitative information on the 
importance of endogenous growth in provoking a switch to agriculture, but are also capable of 
providing guesses at the base parameters of the model.  
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature on the 
agricultural revolution and endogenous growth and discusses how this paper improves this literature. 
Section II reviews some stylized facts about the transition to agriculture and introduces the data used 
in the empirical analysis. In section III the theoretical model is presented, and in section IV, the 
estimation procedure is discussed and implemented. Section V concludes.  
 
I.  Literature on the Neolithic revolution 
  It is generally agreed that the lifting of the last ice age around 10000 BC created conditions 
amenable to agriculture in some parts of the world. Archaeological evidence suggests that agriculture 
first appeared c. 8500 BC (perhaps earlier) in the Fertile Crescent with wheat and barley cultivation, 
in Central Mexico (8000 BC) with maize cultivation and in Southern China (7500 BC) with the 
cultivation of rice. Other initial centers where it is possible agriculture developed independently 
include Northern China (7500 BC – millet) the South Central Andes (5800 BC – potato, manioc), the Eastern United States (3200 BC- sunflower) and Sub-Saharan Africa (2500 BC - sorghum).
1  From 
these centers, agriculture spread to surrounding areas, producing a dramatic change in the nature of 
the means of subsistence and lifestyle of the world’s population. Cohen (1977) writes that: “Slightly 
more than 10000 years ago, the overwhelming majority of people lived by farming. By 2000 years 
ago, the overwhelming majority of people lived by farming…”
2  
While different researchers place different weights on their relative importance, the bulk of 
theoretical explanations for the transition to agriculture generally have two components: 1) a list of 
initial conditions favorable to the adoption of agriculture, and 2) what Pryor (1983) refers to as an 
“inclusive causal mechanism;” that is, a dynamic force(s) that brings about the transition to 
agriculture given initial conditions. Commonly cited initial conditions leading to the adoption of 
agriculture include environmental conditions (e.g., soil quality, good climate, cultigen availability, 
environmental richness), the presence of the right technologies (e.g., tool sophistication and storage 
technology), and the existence of necessary cultural behaviors or lifestyles (e.g., recognition of 
individual property rights, sedentism).
3  
The most-commonly invoked causal mechanism used to explain the adoption of agriculture is 
population stress. Population growth alters the relative productivities of hunting and gathering and 
agriculture. In the presence of diminishing returns in hunting and gathering, as population grows,  the 
returns to hunting and gathering fall. This increases the relative returns to engaging in agriculture, 
which is less susceptible to diminishing returns.
4   
                                                 
1 I have relied upon the account in Olsson (2001). His information on crops comes from Diamond (1997), while 
the dates of initial cultivation derive from Smith (1998). This list might be expanded to include parts of 
Indonesia and sub-Saharan Africa.  
2 Cohen (1977, p. 5-6), quoted in Pryor (1983, p. 94).   
3 The interested reader should consult Pryor (1983) and Weisdorf (2003) for a detailed discussion of 
anthropological and archaeological theories of the transition. The following is an abbreviated topical list of 
references discussed in Pryor (1983). For discussion of environment and the transition to agriculture, see Whyte 
(1977), Sauer (1952), or Redman (1977). On culture and the transition, see Braidwood (1960), and on tools 
necessary for agriculture, see Polgar (1975). Isaac (1970) relates the adoption of agriculture to a change in 
world view.  
4 Others have emphasized different sorts of causal mechanisms which are driven by diminishing returns in 
hunting and gathering. For example, Boserup (1965) describes a causal mechanism in which diminishing 
returns in hunting stimulates invention. The primary role played by economists in explaining the transition to agriculture has been in 
elaborating the exact nature of this causal mechanism.
5 North and Thomas (1977) present a model in 
which a switch to agriculture is provoked by diminishing returns due to the common property nature 
of production in the hunter-gatherer economy, and point to the property rights necessary for 
agriculture as a critical factor in producing less severe diminishing returns in agriculture. V. Smith 
(1975) describes a model in which it is not overpopulation, but overexploitation that generates 
diminishing returns to hunting and gathering. Locay (1989) presents a well-developed formal 
treatment of the transition in which agents simultaneously make fertility decisions, choose whether or 
not to engage in agriculture, and choose a degree of sedentism. In his model, population pressure 
encourages sedentism, which in turn raises the relative returns to engaging in agriculture and lowers 
the costs of having children. Myers and Marceau (2003) view technological progress as the engine 
which produces a shift to agriculture though a more nuanced causal mechanism. They show that 
technological progress places disproportionate stress on cooperative modes of production like hunting 
and gathering; thus, technological progress may result in a collapse of the band style of life and a 
switch to agriculture. 
6 
More recent work has focused on the idea that technological progress itself depends on 
population and environment, and has sought to more clearly elucidate the relationship between 
hunting and gathering, agriculture, technology, and population. In his detailed review of the economic 
literature on the agricultural revolution, Wiesdorf (2003a) attributes recent interest in this approach to 
the popularity of the economics of very-long-run growth, as exemplified in the work of Galor and 
Weil (2000) and Kremer (1993), though perhaps some fraction of this popularity might be attributed 
to the success of Jared Diamond’s (1997) popular work Guns, Germs, and Steel. Olsson and Hibbs 
(2002) describe a model in which geography and environmental conditions directly determine the 
                                                 
5 An excellent recent review of economic models of the transition is Weisdorf (2003), which provides 
a taxonomy of the “standard” causal mechanism.  
6 A related line of research is explored in Bowles and Kim (2003). While they do not provide a theory of 
the transition itself, they do discuss a closely related idea: conditions under which maintenance of 
and respect for private property is an evolutionarily stable strategy. subsequent rate of technological progress by allowing for expanded opportunities for 
experimentation. Morand (2002) focuses on the relationship between human capital accumulation, 
interfamilial household transfers, and foraging/hunting and agriculture. Weisdorf (2003b) focuses on 
the emergence of non-food-producing specialists and the switch to agriculture; in his model, 
agriculture generates more food per unit land, but also involves more learning time. He shows that as 
technological progress occurs, more intensive methods of production are adopted that require non-
food specialists.
7  
It is worth noting that similar ideas have emerged in disciplines other than economics. For 
example, Rindos (1984) and MacNeish (1992) represent two attempts in the 
anthropological/archaeological literature to characterize the relationships between population, 
environment, and technological progress. In their work, population growth and technological progress 
are seen as complementary processes that may enhance one another in a variety of different ways in a 
variety of different circumstances. Indeed, Diamond (1997), who links differences in initial 
conditions to the subsequent development of a wide variety of institutions and technological progress 
developments is perhaps the epitome of this line of research.  
  From this literature, one might form the following “consensus” theory of the emergence of 
agriculture. Continuing population growth both decreases returns to hunting and gathering due to the 
common production nature of hunting and gathering, and simultaneously increases the returns to 
engaging in agriculture by increasing the degree of technological sophistication. At some point, 
increased technological sophistication, population pressure, and increased exploitation of the 
commons generate a situation in which a switch in the mode of production becomes desirable. 
  My theoretical model seeks to capture these basic ideas, with some improvements; for 
example, I expand the model to include decisions over whether or not to enforce property rights 
following De Meza and Gould (1992). The inclusion of decisions to enforce property rights may seem 
                                                 
7 An issue not pursued in this paper are welfare changes resulting from the shift to agriculture. Olsson and 
Hibbs (2003) discusses this issue, and Robson (2003) also discusses this issue in a bioeconomic 
interpretation of the Neolithic revolution. to be a rather small theoretical innovation, but it has important theoretical implications for the 
resulting structure of the model. For one, the resulting model allows for mutually exclusive common 
property hunter-gatherer and full ownership agricultural steady-states, and is therefore capable of 
explaining why some societies never switched to agriculture.
8 Second, my model allows derivation of 
some features of the economy that are assumed in other papers. For example, Olson and Hibbs 
(2002), V. Smith (1975), and North and Thomas (1977) all assume that agriculture is a constant 
returns to scale activity, while hunting and gathering is subject to diminishing returns. By inclusion of 
an explicit enclosure process, I show how this assumption may be derived, and the inclusion of an 
enclosure process also allows for agriculture to be a constant returns to scale technology over a range 
of population. When all land is enclosed, diminishing marginal returns to agriculture set in, and the 
economy approaches a fully agricultural steady-state.  
  Perhaps the most important feature of the model I present is that it is designed to align with 
the ethnographic record. While most theories of the transition to agriculture generally match the broad 
anecdotal evidence on the Neolithic revolution, and are quite nuanced in their theoretical 
construction, there has been virtually no systematic empirical assessment of the transition, or even 
any assessment as to how important the various causal factors (population growth, diminishing 
returns in hunting and gathering, technological progress) actually are in provoking a transition to 
agriculture.
9 A strength of my model is that it allows for such an assessment, and as a first step in 
drawing a link between the empirical evidence and theories of the transition to agriculture, in the next 
section I introduce some stylized facts relating to the decision to engage in agriculture, at least as it 
appears in a cross-sectional sample of 186 pre-modern societies from around the world.  
  
                                                 
8 Indeed, Pryor (1983) criticized models of the Neolithic Revolution because they focused only on the transition 
to agriculture, while ignoring what he deemed to be a question just as interesting: why did some peoples 
apparently not switch to agriculture? 
9 An early attempt along the lines explored in this paper is Pryor (1985), which I discuss in section III. While 
Olson and Hibbs (2003) do not exclusively assess the transition to agriculture; they do discuss the impacts 
initial resource endowments apparently have on the growth history of regions of the world.  II.  Some evidence from cross-sectional data 
The purpose of this section is to develop a complete picture as is possible of the 
environmental, material, and technological situation of hunter-gatherers and subsistence agricultural 
societies around the world. While it may be obvious that technological progress, population growth, 
environment, and the transition to agriculture are related, it is important to develop a factual picture as 
to how exactly agricultural societies differ from hunter-gatherer societies in each dimension. 
Unfortunately, archaeological evidence is too sparse and too inexact for developing precise 
comparisons.
10  
The approach here is based upon that described in Pryor (1983), who focused on the 
incidence of agriculture across a representative sample of indigenous cultures – including hunter-
gatherers, pastoral societies, and subsistence-agricultural societies – and investigated the relationship 
between technology, population, and the incidence of agriculture among these peoples.
11 Following 
Pryor (1983), I employ the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (henceforth SCCS), an extensive cross-
cultural data set originating in the work of Murdock and White (1969).
12 The SCCS contains 
information on the technological sophistication, environmental conditions, and material and social 
culture of 186 indigenous cultures situated around the world. The majority of the cultures in the 
SCCS was sampled at a time coinciding with or just after contact with western cultures, and can be 
taken to be reasonably representative of the distribution of world cultures prior to extensive contact 
                                                 
10 Fendon (1959) attempted to extensively catalogue the environmental characteristics of 11 initial hearths in 
which agriculture developed. While detailed, his analysis serves to illustrate the point that one cannot reach 
definitive conclusions with so few observations.   
11 One might wonder what information one can extract about the origins of agriculture from a relatively recent 
state of affairs. Interestingly, modern information from the genetic landscape (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-
Sforza, 1996) and linguistic landscape (e. g., Ruhlen, 1999) contain substantial traces of past population 
movements, and bears important hints about the origins of agriculture.  
12 While the original work describing the SCCS is Murdock and White (1969), this work was the result of a 
process that began with Murdock’s efforts to quantitatively summarize what is known about the world’s 
cultures. Murdock’s first efforts in the 1930’s and 1940’s resulted in the Human Relations Areas Files. Murdock 
(1957) introduced the World Ethnographic Sample, which was subsequently honed into the Ethnographic Atlas 
(Murdock, 1967). The Ethnographic Atlas summarized crucial aspects of the technology and cultural life of 862 
different cultures. The SCCS resulted from an effort to systematize the evidence in the Ethnographic Atlas and 
account for problems such as over-counting of similar cultures and poor data. with the west.
13 In developing the SCCS, Murdock and White chose societies for inclusion so that the 
resulting sample of world cultures would be representative of known historical and indigenous 
cultures, while at the same time allowing for maximal geographic and cultural diversity.  
The SCCS contains in total 186 observations, each comprising a separate culture. It includes 
sub-Saharan African hunter gatherers (such as the !Kung bushmen), Native American hunter-
gatherers (such as the Pomo), indigenous European peoples (such as the historical Basque society and 
the Lapps), large-scale agricultural nation-state cultures of Meso-America (such as the Aztecs), and 
historical nation-state peoples (such as the ancient Hebrews and Egyptians), in addition to a variety of 
others. The distribution of these societies throughout the world is shown on Map 1.
14 The position of 
each society on the map is labeled according to its numbering in the SCCS. Agricultural societies are 
marked with rectangles, while hunter-gatherers are marked with circles. Those societies marked with 
hexagons and trapezoids are not quite so easily classified; hexagons denote peoples which practice 
some degree of agriculture but are best described as hunter-gatherers, while those marked with 
trapezoids are cultures which are societies that practice little agriculture, but are not hunter-gatherers 
(typically, pastoral peoples that rely primarily on animal husbandry).  
The SCCS contains not only information on the incidence of agriculture in different societies, 
but also includes information on each society’s technological sophistication, population density, and 
environment. Indeed, in the time that has elapsed since its inception, the SCCS has been extended to 
include a variety of measures of environmental quality, including rainfall data, measures of habitat 
                                                 
13 The mean contact year for societies in the SCCS is 1853. However, it must be said that there is great variance 
in the amount of contact the societies in the SCCS in fact had with the modern western world, and the SCCS 
does not include any information about the degree to which societies have had contact with other centers of 
development, such as the Far East. Also, some of the evidence in the sample was gathered using available 
ancient sources. 
14 Locations are approximate; I constructed this figure freehand using the continental maps in Murdock and 
Provost (1969). diversity, and soil quality. Table 1 describes the nature of the variables in the SCCS which I employ 
in this analysis.
15  
The SCCS reports for each society the relative contribution of agriculture to subsistence, as 
described in the first column of table 1. The contribution of agriculture scale runs from a minimum of 
1 (no agriculture) to a maximum of 6 (exclusive agriculture). In labeling societies as agricultural or 
hunter-gatherer, I classified those societies that received a 1, 2, or 3 on the scale as hunter-gatherers, 
and those societies that received a 4, 5, or 6 on the scale as agricultural societies. A small group of 
societies in the SCCS rely heavily on animal husbandry, and these societies I classified as 
agricultural; as Denton (2004) argues, these societies bear closer resemblance to agricultural societies 
than hunter-gatherers.
16 Table 2 is a histogram of the SCCS’s measure of importance of agriculture in 
subsistence, and shows that most of the observations are concentrated at the tails. Thus, the 
characterization of societies as either agricultural or hunter-gatherers, while an approximation of 
reality, is a fairly accurate working representation. The bulk of the societies in the SCCS tend to 
either practice agricultural more or less exclusively or practice little to no agriculture.   
Table 1 also describes information on population density for each culture; the density 
measure in the SCCS is essentially the logarithm of population density. The next two variables on 
Table 1 are measures of the level of technological sophistication of the societies in the SCCS. The 
first measures the degree to which the society is specialized in the performance of three tasks: metal 
working, pottery making, and leather working, while the second measures the sophistication of the 
writing and record-keeping system present in each society. I shall rely primarily on these two 
                                                 
15 I reduced the larger set of characteristics in the data set to those here through a process of experimentation, 
and also by observing that many different sorts of environmental characteristics are heavily correlated. The 
journal World Cultures publishes a continually growing version of the SCCS twice a year.  
16 These are the societies marked with trapezoids on Figure 5. They are best described as pastoral peoples and 
include: Kazaks (65), Khalka Mongols (66), Yurak Samoyed (53), Lapps (52), Goajiro (159), Somali (36), 
Pastoral Fulani (25), Nama Hottentot (1), Chukchee (121), Teda (40), Masai (34), Rwala Bedouin (46), and 
Toda (61). The bulks of these societies received a score of 3 on the agriculture contribution scale, but obtain 
about 70% of their livelihood from animal husbandry.  measures of technological sophistication to track the overall level of technological sophistication 
present in a society.  
The list of variables on table 1 concludes with several measures of environmental conditions 
present in each society’s location. The first three variables derive from Cashdan’s (2003) data on 
rainfall, which she computed using data from the weather station nearest the society’s location (the 
SCCS reports a position for each of its societies in longitude and latitude). The first rainfall variable is 
simply the mean yearly rainfall measured in centimeters, and the second captures the presence of 
exceptionally high rainfall, which I computed using information on the distribution of mean rainfall 
across all societies in the SCCS, defining “high rainfall” to be yearly rainfall greater than one 
standard deviation over the average SCCS value. The third variable is Cashdan’s (2003) measure of 
the year-to-year coefficient of variation in mean rainfall.  
The next three measures of environmental conditions on table 1 are from Pryor (1983). Pryor 
created these measures by inspecting FAO/UNESCO maps and making an assessment as to how 
amenable climatic and soil conditions were to agriculture. His scale variables range from zero to 4, 
with 4 denoting the presence of climatic or soil conditions very favorable to agriculture, and zero 
denoting that the climate or soil conditions render agriculture basically impossible. The third variable 
is a measure of the degree of land slope in each society’s area; this scale also runs from zero to 4. A 
zero indicates the presence of a nearly flat landscape, while a 4 indicates a mountainous landscape 
with rapid elevation changes.  
Additional environmental characteristics include Cashdan’s (2003) count of the number of 
habitats occurring within 200 miles of the society’s SCCS location, which can be taken to be a 
measure of the habitat diversity present in each society’s location. The final environmental variable, 
primary production, measures the capacity of the environment for production of plant life. I computed this number through a transformation of mean solar radiation/evapotranspiration data derived from 
UNESCO/FAO maps.
17  
The last set of variables described in table 1 pertains strictly to location and distance from 
known ancient centers of civilization. The first is simple great-circle distance from the Fertile 
Crescent in miles. The logic behind including measures of distance from the Fertile Crescent is that 
there have undoubtedly throughout history been technological spillovers between societies. The 
inclusion of distance data is a crude way of measuring the likelihood that such spillovers have 
occurred. There have, of course, been other initial hearths of agriculture and civilization. 
Accordingly, I also developed distance measures from other possible initial hearths of agriculture. 
The four hearths I rely on are those known to be places in which agriculture originated independently: 
Southeastern Asia, Mesoamerica, the Northeastern United States, and the Fertile Crescent.
18 The last 
variable records the time at which the ethnographer’s report was developed; I treat this variable as 
another measure of the likelihood that a society has experienced spillovers from other societies, 
reasoning that isolation from the west, for example, should increase with the date of contact.  
Table 3 presents basic summary statistics for all the variables described in table 1, and 
compares mean values for those societies that can be said to practice agriculture (agriculture in use=1) 
with those that do not (agriculture in use=0). Table 3 provides a picture as to what the agricultural and 
hunter-gatherer societies in the data set look like. Note that I have computed a rough index of the 
technological sophistication of each society (called simply “technology” on the table) by simply 
summing up the two scale variables measuring technological sophistication. The result is a measure 
of technological sophistication which runs from 0 (no specialization and only spoken language) to 8 
                                                 
17 The formula for computing primary production is: 
66 . 1 219 . 0 E PP = , where E  is the measure of 
evapotranspiration. See Kelly (1995, p. 69) for a discussion. The FAO/UNESCO maps only report gradations of 
100 cm/year (for example, clines within which evapotranspiration is between 50 and 150 cm/year), and the 
maps disallow the possibility of being completely accurate in assessing this number. I used the midpoint of the 
clines reported on the maps.  
18 It should be noted that there is some disagreement as to how many initial hearths there really were; estimates 
typically range from as few as 4 or as many as 9 (see Weisdorf (2003)). I rely on the four centers of agriculture 
mainly because other hypothesized centers of agriculture are close to these centers, and practically speaking this 
also limits the potential degrees of freedom in the empirical analysis. (complete specialization in leather-working, metal-working, and pottery-making, and a fully 
developed system of writing and record-keeping). I shall treat this measure as a proxy for the 
sophistication of the general purpose technology present in a society.  
One can see from this data that those societies in the SCCS which practice agriculture tend to 
have both higher population densities and larger degrees of technological sophistication. Inverting the 
log-scale population density reported by the SCCS reveals that the mean population density of hunter-
gatherers is approximately 1.39 persons per square mile, while that of the typical agricultural society 
is approximately 10.07 persons per square mile. Agricultural societies also operate in environments 
that seem to be richer and more suitable to agriculture in several dimensions. Among agricultural 
societies in the sample, climate suitability, soil suitability, yearly rainfall, and primary production are 
all significantly higher than in hunter-gatherer societies.   
The data on table 3 also reveal that agricultural societies are typically closer on average to the 
Fertile Crescent than hunter-gatherers, while the latter are disproportionately closer to another initial 
hearth of agriculture – an observation reflected by the distribution of hunter-gatherers on Map 1. 
Those societies practicing hunting and gathering are distributed farther away from the Fertile 
Crescent and appear disproportionately in Southern Africa, North and South America, Northeastern 
Asia, and to a lesser degree, in Australia and sub-Saharan Africa. The final row of table 3 computes 
the mean of the contribution of agriculture variable, which emphasizes the point underlying table 2, 
that those societies in the hunter-gatherer group tend to engage in almost no agriculture (mean of 1.52 
on the scale), while those that are in the agricultural group tend to engage in agriculture almost 
exclusively (5.19). 
The data on table 3 also reveal that agricultural societies are on average more technologically 
sophisticated than hunter-gatherers. The mean value of my technological sophistication scale for 
hunter-gatherers is 1.52, while the mean value for agricultural societies is 4.00. This evidence verifies 
that agricultural societies are generally more technologically sophisticated than hunter-gatherers. In 
section IV, I use the data presented in the section to fit the theoretical model in section III and solve for reduced-form model parameters. The cardinal interpretation of the technological sophistication 
measure becomes important, and I discuss these issues in detail in the latter half of section IV.   
The evidence suggests that those societies that practice agriculture are more technologically 
sophisticated, more densely populated, and function in environments which appear to be richer and 
more amenable to agriculture. Moreover, agricultural societies in the sample tend to be closer to the 
Fertile Crescent. Also, it is approximately true that a rough snapshot of existing cultures shows that 
societies tend to be either agricultural or not; few societies split their time equally between alternative 
modes of production. Armed with these basic features of the transition, in the next section, I describe 
a simple theoretical model which is capable of explaining these features of the data in section III. In 
section IV of the paper, I shall return to this data, with which I assess the relative importance of 
environment, technological progress, and technological spillover in provoking a switch to agriculture.  
 
III.  The Theoretical Model  
In constructing a model of the agricultural revolution, I seek to achieve the following: 1) 
capturing the essential features of previous theoretical models of the Neolithic revolution (as 
described in Locay (1989), Marceau and Myers (2003), Weisdorf (2003), Morand (2003), and others), 
while at the same time adding some important theoretical improvements, 2) capture the essential 
features of the Neolithic revolution as they are borne out in the data presented in section II, and 3) to 
generate a form of the model which can be fit with cross-sectional data. This final task involves 
setting up a model which is capable of being phrased in terms of the data discussed in the previous 
section.  
 
1.  Hunting and gathering, agriculture, and the enclosure decision 
I begin by describing a static version of the model, which I later render dynamic by adding a 
non-overlapping generations population dynamic and a relationship describing technological 
progress. The static formulation of the model is a modified and parameterized version of De Meza and Gould’s (1992) model of the enclosure process, but also resembles Locay (1989) in that agents 
make output-maximizing decisions as to whether to engage in agriculture or hunting and gathering, 
and utility-maximizing decisions about fertility. Otherwise, the model is a standard model of the 
transition in that the basic engines for the transition to agriculture are improvements in technology 
and population pressure.  
There is a population of n  agents, and a fixed amount of land Z . Initially each agent is 
allocated an equal share of the available land  n Z z / = . The initial endowment of land is the inverse 
of population density, which I define to be  Z n p / = . The initial endowment of land given to an 
agent does not convey property rights in the land, but merely affords the agent the opportunity to 
enclose some portion of the endowment.
19 Agents are endowed with one unit of time, which may be 
allocated to three different activities: hunting and gathering, agriculture, and enclosure of land.  The 
time constraint each agent faces is:  
1 = + + E F H τ τ τ .         ( 1 )  
I assume that the costs of enclosing e units of land are given by simply given by  c e/ , where 
c is a parameter capturing (the inverse of) enclosure costs. Enclosure generates exclusive property 
rights over the land for the agent.
20 Taking into account that each agent may not enclose more land 
than they are originally allocated, and that c e E / = τ , the time constraint (1) may be rewritten as:  
1 / = + + c e F H τ τ ,   n Z e / ≤ .       ( 2 )  
Agents engage in hunting and gathering in common on unenclosed land, and earn returns 
equal to the average product of labor on this land. Let  H τ  represent time devoted to hunting and 
gathering by the average agent. Aggregate output in hunting and gathering depends on the total land 
                                                 
19 This is similar to the approach employed in Baker (2003), which studies in detail hunter-gatherer land 
ownership regimes.  
20 Thus, I do not consider the possibility that land rights may be contested through conflict. Baker (2003), 
Grossman and Kim (1995), and Skaperdas (1992) model interactions of this sort.  available for hunting and gathering,  H Z , and on total effort devoted to hunting and gathering by the 
population,  H nτ , according to the production function:  
H H
H H H H Z n X
α α τ θ
− =
1 ) ( ,          ( 3 )  
In equation (3),  H θ  is a parameter reflecting total factor productivity in hunting and 
gathering. Agents receive a share of  H X  proportional to their own efforts relative to the effort levels 
of the rest of the population. If an agent devotes  H τ  units of time to hunting and gathering, and the 









α α τ θ
τ
τ − =
1 ) ( .        ( 4 )  
The aggregate amount of land available for hunting and gathering depends upon how much 
land remains unenclosed. Thus,   
* e n Z Z H − = ,   n Z e /
* ≤ .       ( 5 )  
In equation (5), 
* e  represents the amount of land enclosed by the average agent in 
equilibrium; therefore  n e
*  represents total land enclosures. If it should happen that  n Z e /
* = , then 
all land is enclosed in equilibrium, which results in  0 = H Z , rendering hunting and gathering 
infeasible.  
Agents also may devote time to agriculture, but agricultural production requires two inputs: 
enclosed land e and labor time  F τ . The production function for agriculture is given by:  
F Fe x F F F
α α τ θ
− =
1 .         ( 6 )  
The parameter  F θ  in equation (6) captures total factor productivity in agriculture, given a 
fixed time and land investment in agriculture. Equations (1-6) allow description of agents’ 
equilibrium output-maximizing time allocation decisions. I solve for a symmetric equilibrium in which agents maximize total food production subject to the time constraint and initial allocation of 
land, given the decisions of other agents (i.e., taking as given population averages). Using the time 
constraint (2), the hunting and gathering production function (4), and the agricultural production 
function (5), any agent’s total output of food may be written as:   
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+ =
1 1 ) ( ) (
) / 1 (
.   (7) 
Equation (7) describes agents’ output as a function of  F τ  and e. Depending on parameters, 
equilibrium output maximizing decisions may result in three different equilibria: one in which agents 
hunt exclusively; one in which agents allocate time to enclosure, agriculture, and hunting; and one in 
which exclusively allocate time to enclosure and agriculture. To understand the conditions under 




























































.     (8) 
The two partial derivatives in (8) indicate that, in an equilibrium in which agents engage in all 
three tasks (hunting and gathering, enclosure, and agriculture), 1) the marginal product of agricultural 
effort must equal the average product of hunting and gathering effort, and 2) the marginal product of 
enclosure effort must equal the average product of effort in hunting and gathering. If the equilibrium 
is indeed interior, the two first-order conditions in (8) may be set equal to zero and solved directly for 














.        ( 9 )    
Substituting the optimal ratio in (9) into either equation in (8) results in the following 
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F F c
α α α α ψ
− − =
1 ) 1 (  (10) 
The left hand side of equation (10) is the marginal product of effort devoted to enclosure 
and/or agriculture at the optimal  F e τ /  ratio, given that  n Z e / ≤ . That is,  ψ θ F F mp = . The right 
hand side of equation (10) is the average product of effort in hunting and gathering, described as a 
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) ( .      ( 1 1 )  
Both land enclosure and time allocation decisions can be described in terms of  F mp  and 
) (e apH , and through comparison of these two functions, it is also easy to assess when corner 
solutions occur, i. e., when agents engage in only hunting and gathering or only in enclosure and 
agriculture. If agents devote time to all three tasks, it must be the case that agents have an incentive to 
engage in agriculture, but not so much an incentive that they decide to completely enclose all 
available land. Formally, agents have an incentive to enclose some land and engage in agriculture if 
  F H mp ap < ) 0 ( .         ( 1 2 )    
Inequality (12) means that the value of a unit of effort in hunting and gathering is lower than 
a unit of effort devoted to enclosure and agriculture when agents are devoting no time to enclosure 
and agriculture. If agents are to engage in some hunting and gathering while simultaneously engaging 
in agriculture and enclosure, it must be the case that  ) (e apH  overtakes  F mp  at some point 
n Z e /
* < . This can only happen if  0 ) ( > ′ e p a H , so that the average product of effort in hunting and 
gathering must increase as enclosures increase. The condition  0 ) ( > ′ e p a H  means that the removal of 
labor from the commons due to enclosure must exert a larger impact on commons returns than the 
removal of land from the commons due to enclosure. Using the functional form for  H ap  in (11) reveals that  0 ) ( > ′ e p a H  if population density  Z n p / =  is less than some critical level of population 
density, which I label 
*
2 p :  
*










.         ( 1 3 )  
If inequality (13) is satisfied, then  ∞ → ) (e ap  as  n Z e / → . Thus, condition (13) 
guarantees both that  0 ) ( > ′ e p a H  and also that  F H mp e ap = ′) (  at some  n Z e / < ′ . Given that 
condition (13) is satisfied, condition (12) can then be viewed as both a necessary and sufficient 















.         ( 1 4 )  
Solving (14) for population density gives a threshold value of population density necessary 


















,         ( 1 5 )    
The relationship between  ) (e apH ,  ) (e mp , 
*
1 p , and 
*
2 p  are illustrated in figure 2. The result 
bears close resemblance to De Meza’s and Gould’s (1992) model of the enclosure process. On figure 
2, the average product curve  ) ( 2 e apH  generates interior enclosures. For the curve  ) ( 1 e apH , 
however, the average product of hunting is everywhere above  F mp , which result in a hunting and 
gathering equilibrium with  0
* = e .  For  ) ( 3 e apH , both the first and third conditions are violated. In 




1 p p < , as I have assumed in figure 2.
21 Together, the critical 
population densities 
*
1 p   and 
*
2 p  admit a complete description of the effort allocation decisions 
across the population, and table 4 summarizes results that are essential for what follows: 1) the effort 
allocation decisions of agents given different population densities and parameter values, and 2) the 
payoffs agents earn in each type of equilibrium.
22 If, however, one is to rely on a model like this to 
explain the Neolithic transition to agriculture there must be, in Pryor’s (1985) words, “an inclusive 
causal mechanism.” Population density must somehow reach the critical values, or something must 
change the relative magnitudes of total factor productivities in hunting and gathering and agriculture. 
In the next subsection I address population dynamics, and follow the discussion with a specification 
describing how technological sophistication influences total factor productivity. 
2.  Population Dynamics 
I now supplement the model to include a simple non-overlapping generations structure to 
capture population growth. Population growth occurs as the result of optimizing decisions on the part 
of agents concerning numbers of children. Suppose that agents have utility over consumption and 
children: 
2 / 1 2 / 1 2 n c u = .
23 
Agents reproduce asexually by devoting resources to production of children, and the resource 
costs of having children are given by b .
24 Given lifetime food production of  t x  at any time t, a 
particular agent i at time t chooses the number of children to have to maximize lifetime utility:  
                                                 








2 p p Z n ∈ : an 
equilibrium with no agriculture, and an equilibrium with no hunting. De Meza and Gould (1992) discuss results 
of this sort. I rule out this case strictly for convenience, and the decision to do so is supported by the results of 
the calibration and estimation exercises in the empirical section of the paper.  



















which shows clearly the relationship between population density, critical values, and enclosures.  









n bn x Max
iit
.          ( 1 6 )  
Solving the problem in (16) yields the following optimal number of children per agent:  
b x n t it /
*
1 = + .          ( 1 7 )  
In equilibrium all agents make the same effort allocation decisions, earn the same payoffs, 



















t .         ( 1 8 )  
Dividing equation (18) by Z  gives equation (19), which describes the evolution of 














t .         ( 1 9 )     
Equation (19) is a simple Malthusian population dynamic. When the ratio  b xt /  is greater 
than unity, population density increases. In this way, population growth depends upon the underlying 
mode of production of the economy, as summarized in table 4. Substituting in the exact form for 
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.  ) , [
*
2 ∞ ∈ p pt .   (20) 
Equation (20) reveals the impact of both total factor productivity and the organization of 
production on population growth. When  ] , 0 [
*
1 p pt ∈  and agents are engaged exclusively in hunting 
                                                                                                                                                       
24 I shall assume throughout that b  is constant. In an earlier version of the paper, following Locay (1989), I 
employed a formulation in which b varied according to the mobility of the population. I employ this 
specification for reasons that will become clear in the empirical specification and estimation of the model.  and gathering, and  when  ) , [
*
2 ∞ ∈ p pt , so that agents are engaged exclusively in agriculture, 
population density increases at a decreasing rate towards a steady state level. However, 




1 p p pt ∈ , so that agents engage in both hunting and gathering and agriculture, density 
grows at a constant rate. Thus, the model produces a population “explosion,” during which population 
growth occurs at a steady pace and the economy progresses towards the point at which full enclosure 
of land occurs. Population growth slows once the full enclosure point is reached.  
It is possible that a population density 
*
1 p p ≥  will never be reached. In this case, the 
economy will never progress past the hunter-gatherer stage. One way of making this assessment is to 
see whether or not steady state hunter-gatherer population density, call it  H p , is compatible with the 
no-agriculture condition 
*
1 p p < . The steady-state hunter gatherer population is obtained by solving 
0 / = ∆ t t p p  for  ] , 0 [
*
















H p  is less than 
*
1 p  so long as:  
b F ≤ ψθ .          ( 2 1 )    
  Inequality (21) describes a threshold value for total factor productivity in agriculture. If (21) 
does not hold, the hunter gatherer society will eventually reach a point at which agents begin to 
enclose land and engage in agriculture, and steady population eventually leading to a fully 
agricultural economy will begin. Figure 3 describes this sequence of events graphically, reminiscent 
of the model described in North and Thomas (1977). On the figure, two hypothetical versions of the 
t t p p / ∆  function are plotted. The growth equation  1 / t t p p ∆  describes a situation in which hunting 
and gathering is stable. By contrast, the population growth equation  2 / t t p p ∆  shows an economy for 
which  p  eventually exceeds
*
1 p . In this case, the economy transitions through a phase in which incipient agriculture is practiced (characterized by increasing enclosures, increasing allotments of 
time for enclosure and agriculture, and sustained population growth). Finally, the economy becomes 
fully agricultural and all land is enclosed, diminishing returns in agriculture set in, and population 
growth again slows towards a steady-state.   
3.  Technological Progress 
I now expand the model to include technological progress. I shall describe a process by which 
what can be thought of as a general purpose technology develops, and I shall then describe how 
varying degrees of technology impacts the productivity parameters  H θ  and  F θ . The productivity of 
agriculture and of hunting and gathering are influenced by things other than just technological 
capabilities; most notably, environmental conditions also influence the productivity of agriculture or 
hunting and gathering. Further, there is also no reason to believe that technological capability and 
environment influence hunting and gathering and agriculture in the same way. The model should be 
flexible enough to reflect all of these concerns.  
With these ideas in mind, I assume that the parameters   i θ   F H i , = , depend upon the 
resource base available for each production technology, which I refer to as  F H i ri , , = , and 
“technology,” which I refer to as  A, according to the functions:  
H H A rH H
σ µ θ = ;,  
F F A rF F
σ µ θ = ,       ( 2 1 )     
I assume that:  
H F σ σ > ,            ( 2 2 )  
The functions in (21) posit a functional relationship between environment, technology, and 
productivity, while equation (22) posits that agricultural productivity is relatively more sensitive to 
technology than hunting and gathering productivity. This implies that any improvement in technology 
disproportionately increases the productivity of agriculture, given environmental conditions, and in 
the model generates the impetus towards the enclosure of land and adoption of agriculture as the 
technological situation of the society improves. In any case, (22) is an assumption for which I shall provide some supporting evidence in the next section of the paper. Following Kremer (1993), I 
suppose that technological progress depends on the existing knowledge base and the current 
population density. However, I also allow the process describing technological progress to depend 
upon  E τ , the fraction of time spent enclosing land:  
) , , ( E t t t A p A A τ = ∆ .         ( 2 3 )  
While the first two arguments of (23) are familiar, what role does  E τ  play in influencing the 
nature of technological progress? I include  E τ  in (23) as a proxy for changes in lifestyle that follow 
from land enclosure. Enclosing a piece of property implies a degree of sedentism and fixity of 
residence, and this lifestyle change should alter the way in which new technology is generated, 
processed, and stored by a society, in addition to influencing the applicability of the existing stock of 
knowledge in new situations.
25 By this, I mean that individuals who stay in one place may have more 
occasion to learn from past experience in this location, but also have better incentives to engage in 
innovative activity if working parcels that they own.  
I assume that (23) has the following form:  
t H t t H t A A p k A
H H δ
φ η − = ∆ ,   0 = E τ  
t F t t F t A A p k A
F F δ
φ η − = ∆    0 > E τ .   (24) 
The technological accumulation function (24) is a generalization from Kremer’s (1993) 
conceptualization in a couple of dimensions. First, (24) allows for vintage effects, captured by the 
depreciation of knowledge at a rate captured by the depreciation parameter i δ .
26 Second, (24) allows 
for a change in the nature of knowledge accumulation with changes in lifestyle. I have chosen to 
model the change in functional form as discrete and as one that occurs the instant a society begins the 
enclosure process and engaging in some degree of agriculture. One might make this specification 
more complex, by positioning the switching point at some ) 1 , 0 (
* ∈ E τ , or by postulating some other 
                                                 
25 I refer here to the tendency for agricultural societies to be less nomadic than hunter gatherers, though, there 
are examples of hunter-gatherers that are relatively sedentary, and examples of agricultural societies which are 
relatively nomadic.  
26 See, for example, Turnovsky (2001). functional relationship. I have opted for the simplest approach to keep the model tractable, and in 
light of the fact that detecting more complex changes in knowledge accumulation is beyond the 
capabilities of the data. As a working hypothesis, it seems reasonable to suppose that: 
H F η η > ,   H F φ φ > ,  H F δ δ < ,  H F k k > .   (25) 
The collective assumptions in (25) capture the idea that the agricultural environment is more 
amenable to production of technological improvements. Whether or not the assumptions in (25) are 
warranted is ultimately an empirical matter, and I shall offer support for these assumptions in the 
empirical section of the paper. The simple hypothesis is that endogenous growth effects intensify as 
societies begin to engage in enclosure. To be precise, the first two assumptions in (25), respectively, 
mean that that the marginal impact of population density on knowledge and the marginal impact of 
knowledge on the change in knowledge is larger for a society engaging in agriculture than for a 
hunter-gatherer society. The third inequality in (25) indicates that the rate at which knowledge 
depreciates is lower in a society that engages in agriculture.  
The immediate consequence of this specification for the beginnings of agriculture are 
rendered clear by reinterpreting the analog condition used to derive the critical population density 
*
1 p . Substituting the productivity parameters in (21) into equation (15) gives a new necessary 































.    (26) 
Condition (26) shows how higher population density, higher levels of technological 
sophistication, the hunting and gathering resource base, and the agricultural resource base influence 
the likelihood that agriculture will begin to be practiced, given a level of population density. The 
nature of the critical population density at which full enclosure occurs, 
*
2 p , has not changed condition 
for full enclosure of land. The model may now be summarized by the following two-equation system 
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27      )] ( , 0 [
*
1 A p pt ∈ , 
 =  F t t F
F F A p k δ
φ η −
−1       ] ), ( [
*
1 ∞ ∈ A p pt  (27.b) 
For the time being, I assume that:   
1 < + i i φ η ;  1 < + i i α σ .         ( 2 8 )  
The inequalities in equation (28) mean, respectively, that the production function exhibits 
diminishing returns to scale in its two arguments, population density and knowledge, and that 
production is not overly technology-dependent or labor intensive..
28 There are two possible eventual 
outcomes of the system dynamics described by equations (27a-b), displayed as phase diagrams in 
figures 3 and 4. Consider first figure 3, which describes how a simple-hunter-gatherer economy might 
progress into a fully-agricultural economy. The state of this economy at the close of the last ice age 
would be represented by a point in the phase space very close to the origin, between the null-clines, 
where population density and technological sophistication is very low. At this point, the system 
dynamics call for increasing technology and increasing population in co-dependent fashion until the 
constraint line described by  ) (
*
1 A p  is encountered. Here, enclosure of land begins and population 
growth accelerates. Coincident with this sustained population growth are increasing levels of 
knowledge and increasing levels of land enclosure. Eventually, all land is enclosed, and population 
growth and technology approach agricultural steady states. The end result of this process is a steady 
                                                 
27 Note that for high values of  A, it may be the case that  2 1 ) ( δ δ < A ; I shall discuss this case in a moment. 
28 These conditions are in fact more restrictive than they have to be to guarantee stable steady-states for the 
model. I shall also present evidence in a subsequent section of the paper that these restrictions in fact hold.  state in which all land is enclosed, technological progress ceases, and population levels off. Such a 
time path is illustrated (roughly) by the dashed arrows included on the diagram.  
Figure 4 shows a case in which the society never reaches a critical mix of technological 
sophistication and population density that provokes a switch to agriculture. In this case, population 
and technology level off at a point where the joint technological sophistication and population density 
result in a switch to agriculture. To more fully elucidate the conditions under which agriculture might 












































,  ) (
*
1 H H A p p < .   (29) 
If the steady-state values solving (29) indeed are consistent with the inequality in (29), 
hunting and gathering is a stable equilibrium outcome. The solutions to (29) reveal that population 
density and technological sophistication ultimately depend upon the rate at which knowledge 
accumulates and is retained, the characteristics of the production function, and the resource base for 
hunting and gathering. In principle, it is possible to substitute the equilibrium values in (30) into the 
switching inequality (26), and obtain precise environmental and spillover conditions which result in a 
switch to agriculture. This exercise yields about what one would expect given the parameters of the 
problem.   
If the inequality in (29) does not hold, as is apparent from figure 4, the following equations 
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*
1 A p pH ≥    (30) 
The equations in (30) do not generate a closed form solution, but the basic idea of can be 









.          ( 3 1 )     Then, the following two equations describe equilibrium technology and population density at 
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*
1 A p pH ≥  (32)   
The fundamental ideas needed for the next section are the steady-state values described in 
(29) and (32), along with the switching inequality (26). These three things allow estimation of the 
model using the cross sectional data introduced in section II, and allow some rough inferences as to 
the relative importance of various environmental features in provoking a switch to agriculture, the 
relationship between total factor productivity in hunting and gathering and agriculture and knowledge 
accumulation, and the importance of endogenous growth effects. In section V, I begin by describing 
the estimation technique. In the latter half of the section, I describe a procedure by which one may use 
the estimated equations to solve for reduced form parameters of the theoretical model.     
 
IV.  Estimation of the Model 
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1 H H A p p ≥    (34) 
The log-linear model in (34) is a two-equation system with what is in effect a condition 
describing endogenous regime switching, in which the applicable regime (hunting-gathering or 
agriculture) depends in part on the relationship between the endogenous variables. As such the model 
can be estimated using the two-step procedure developed by Maddala (1982). The two-step procedure 
involve first fitting a probit model with the prevailing regime as the dependent variable with all model exogenous variables as explanatory variables, and then estimating each of the two steady-state 
systems separately using transformations of the probit model’s Z-scores as additional explanatory 
variables for each system to control for endogenous selection.    
While (34) allows for a qualitative test as to whether or not the basic sign predictions of the 
model are correct, it also admits the possibility of solving for underlying model parameters. Since 
each of the two possible regimes in regimes in (34) consists of a two-equation simultaneous system, 
to recover underlying model parameters, each of the two systems must be exactly identified. The 
population density equations have been endowed through the theoretical model with a natural 
instrument: measures of the resource base, as these do not enter directly into the technology equation. 
It remains to develop an instrument for the technology equations. I postulate that, since most societies 
in the sample have had some sort of contact with the western world, or some other advanced culture 
at the time at which the data for the SCCS was assembled (the fact that an anthropologist collected 
the data signifies some contact, and the data described in table 3 indicate that there is a systematic 
difference relationship between distance and model variables), a natural instrument for technology is 
distance from a center of civilization. Therefore, as an exogenous instrument for technological 
sophistication, I employ simple great-circle distance measures from the Fertile Crescent, and, in the 
event that the society in question is closer to some other initial center of civilization and agriculture, I 
also include great circle distances, from the other initial hearth.
29  
A further necessary task in executing the empirical analysis is developing a univariate 
measure of the quality of the environment for hunting and gathering, and the quality of the 
environment for agriculture. I must construct an environmental quality index that meshes the 
univariate measure of environment in the theoretical model with the environmental factors described 
in section II when the data was introduced. Consider the following index measures of the resource 
base in a given area:  
                                                 







ik ri i r k r
1
γ ,   F H i , = .      ( 3 5 )  
In equation (35),  i M  is the number of environmental factors important to each respective 
mode of production, and  ik γ  is the elasticity of overall environmental quality with respect to the k th 
environmental factor for regimei, F H i , = .  To implement the distance measures, let d  denote 
distance from the Fertile Crescent, let d′ denote distance to an alternative closest point of 
agricultural origins, and let ω  be an indicator variable which equals one if the society is situated 
closer to an initial hearth of agricultural besides the Fertile Crescent. Then, the constant term in each 
of the technology equations in (34) can be written as:   
i i i y d d k k iA i
υ ε ω ε ′ ′ = .   F H i , = .       ( 3 6 )  
The specification in equation (35) allows for the possibility that knowledge spillovers affect 
hunter-gatherers and agricultural societies differently;  H ε  measures the elasticity of technological 
progress with respect to distance from the Fertile Crescent for a hunter-gatherer society, while  F ε  
measures the Fertile Crescent distance elasticity for an agricultural society. The  i ε′ terms have an 
analogous interpretation with respect to distance from another hearth, and also allow for the fact that 
societies positioned closer to another initial hearth may enjoy spillovers from more than one hearth. 
Finally, the  parameter  i υ  measures the elasticity of technology with respect to the year of contact, 
which is yet another measure of “distance” from civilization. Substituting (35) and (36) into (34) 
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Model (37) constitutes an exactly identified system of simultaneous equations with 
endogenous switching, which I estimate using the data described in tables II and III; the two-step 
procedure for estimating models with endogenous switching outlined by Madalla (1982) requires first 
estimating a probit model with the indicator variable for agriculture as a dependent variable, and all 
exogenous variables as independent variables. Table 5 presents the estimates of this first-stage probit 
model. The model indicates that, in addition to environmental characteristics, the distance proxies for 
technological spillovers are important in controlling for the incidence of agriculture. In terms of the 
theoretical model, this is because the greater technological spillovers occurring at closer distances 
increase total factor productivity in agriculture disproportionately. It is interesting to contrast these 
results with those of Pryor (1986, p. 883), who finds that “…agricultural potential variable[s] only 
explain about one-sixth [R
2=0.16] of the variation in the importance of agriculture.”
30 One additional 
point of interest of the probit model in table 5 is that individually, few environmental characteristics 
are apparently useful by themselves in predicting the incidence of agriculture, besides primary 
production. This may be due to the fact that there is considerable multicollinearity among many of the 
environmental features.   
Table 6 shows the full set of estimation results obtained using Maddala’s two-step procedure, 
while the first column on table 6 presents pooled results.
31 The second and third columns present 
estimates for agricultural societies, and the fourth and fifth columns present estimates for hunter-
gatherers (note that, due to missing data, 17 observations of the 186 in the SCCS have been lost). The 
                                                 
30 Pryor’s dependent variable was the reliance on agriculture scale variable described by table 1. As an aside, 
Pryor also explores the implications of including population density in his analysis (my modeling approach 
implies including population density in this fashion is a specification error), and does not mention technological 
sophistication. I obtain an R
2 of 0.30 if I use the agricultural contribution scale as a dependent variable.  
31 Maddala’s (1982) two-step procedure calls for obtaining the Z-scores associated with the probit regression, 
and using 
1 )) ( 1 )( (
− Φ − Z Z φ  as an additional instrument in the hunter-gatherer system of equations and 
1 ) ( ) (
− Φ Z Z φ  as an additional instrument in the agricultural system. Each system may then be estimated 
separately using standard methods.  third and fifth columns drop insignificant variables to minimize multicollinearity, sharpen parameter 
estimates, and check stability.  
What do the estimation results imply about the importance of endogenous growth effects 
(feedback effects between population growth and technology) in generating a switch to agriculture? 
The pooled results (column 1), and both sets of results pertaining to agricultural societies (columns 2 
and 3) indicate that there is reason to believe that higher levels of population density result in higher 
levels of technological sophistication, and vice versa. In all of the first three model estimates on table 
6, the technological sophistication coefficients in the population equation, and the population 
coefficient in the technology equation, are strongly significant and positive. However, the results 
from the hunter-gatherer sample imply these effects do not materialize among hunter-gatherers 
(columns 4 and 5). Among hunter-gatherers, the technology coefficient in the population equation and 
the population coefficient in the technology equation are small, of the wrong sign, and insignificant.. 
Further, it does not appear that hunter-gatherers in the sample have benefited from technological 
spillovers.
32 The results presented in table 6 suggest that the best way of modeling hunter-gatherer 
technological sophistication is to assume that it is exogenous.   
One can think of a variety of reasons why technology appears to be unimportant for hunter-
gatherers. It might be the case that better technology in the hunting and gathering economy does not 
result in an increase in output, because the binding constraint for hunter-gatherers is the level of the 
natural resource. If this is true, better technology and consequent improvements in total factor 
productivity in hunting and gathering might encourage hunter-gatherers to simply enjoy more leisure 
rather than increasing output; in support of this hypothesis, some evidence suggests that labor supply 
in hunter-gatherer economies is elastic.
33 These sorts of effects would interfere with the direct link 
between technology, production, and population growth posited by the model. It is also possible that 
                                                 
32 Indeed, I employed a variety of specifications to try to develop some sort of predictive model of hunter-
gatherer technology, and the relationship proved quite elusive. One of the more interesting hypotheses I 
experimented with was the idea that habitat diversity might influence the rate of accumulation, an idea 
described by Olsson and Hibbs (2003). I could not find any evidence for this hypothesis either.  
33 See Baker and Swope (2004) for background discussion on labor supply in hunter-gatherer economies.  endogenous growth effects are simply too subtle to be detected in the (admittedly rather crude) data 
used to estimate the model.    
The estimated population density equation for hunter-gatherers in the last column of table 6 
does, however, suggest which factors are most important for hunter-gatherer production (and hence 
population density). These factors include habitat diversity, the presence of abnormally high rainfall 
(perhaps picking up the effects of a rain forest-like environment), high primary production, and the 
presence of a relatively flat landscape. Further, it turns out that those hunter-gatherers that live in 
areas with more frost months per year and higher rainfall variation, other things equal, tend to have 
higher population densities. Contrast these results with those of Locay (1996), who finds little 
evidence of a systematic relationship between population and environmental characteristics among a 
sample of North American hunter-gatherers.  
Those factors which appear to lead to systematically higher production, and hence 
population, in agricultural societies appear to be closeness to an ocean, climate and soil suitability for 
agriculture, and the lack of extremely high rainfall.  Interestingly, the estimated equations imply that 
the environmental features related to each mode of production are different, implying that a good 
hunting and gathering environment may not be a good agricultural environment. Those factors which 
intuition suggests should be more important for successful hunting and gathering (such as habitat 
diversity and land slope) do not appear in the agricultural population density equation, while those 
that should be most important to agriculture (climate and soil suitability for agriculture) do not appear 
to influence hunter-gatherer population density.    
Given the presence of exclusive instruments in each of the two equations in (37), it is possible 
to solve for the underlying parameters of the model by employing some additional restrictions on the 
equations, and by fleshing out an exact interpretation of the scale variable which I use to measure 
technological sophistication. Denton (2004) argues that these scale variables should be interpreted on 
a logarithmic scale. His argument rests on the nature of the original complexity index developed by 
Murdock and Provost (1973). Murdock and Provost developed a comprehensive measure of cultural complexity that was a simple sum of the scores a society received on 10 different “subscales” that 
each ran from zero to four. The ten subscales describe the predominant mode of food production, 
writing and record keeping, and task specialization, and also the degree of nomadism, political 
integration of society, and means of land transport.
34 Murdock’s and Provost’s decision to rely on the 
sum of these scales as a measure of complexity was ad hoc, but, after a careful investigation of each 
sub scale, Denton (2004, p. 12-13) concludes that “Without (it seems) realizing they were doing it, 
Murdock and Provost defined each of the 10 subscales in such a way that each of the 10 underlying 
constructs is an exponential function of the subscale that measures it.” That is, to take an example, the 
technological specialization subscale is effectively the log of the actual level of a society’s 
technological sophistication. To be explicit, if  A
~
 is the actual level of technological sophistication, 
and  A is the value of the index, Denton argues that the relationship between the value of the index 
and underlying technological sophistication should be 




If we believe this functional form, then this implies that the actual technological 
sophistication of a society A
~
 should be related to the scale measuring writing and record keeping (w) 
and the degree of technological sophistication (t) according to 
k w t e A
+ + =
) ( ~ ρ . Choosing k  equal to 
zero is essentially a normalization which determines the units of the underlying technological 
sophistication; in this case, when the sum w+t=0, the underlying technological sophistication of the 
society is given by  1
~
= A . It follows that the resulting scale describes things in terms of a society 
which has neither writing nor record-keeping, nor any task specialization – a prototypical Paleolithic 
hunter gatherer. If one were to take ρ =1, then the technological scale variable means that the typical 
hunter-gatherer in the sample, which has a mean value of  52 . 1  for my technological sophistication 
variable (see table 3), is approximately  =
52 . 1 e 4.57 times as sophisticated as the typical Paleolithic 
society. The implication is then that the average agricultural society in the sample is approximately 
                                                 
34 For an application of these measures and further discussion, see Baker and Miceli (2004).  6 . 54
4 = e  times as sophisticated as the typical late Paleolithic society, or 11 times as technologically 
sophisticated as the typical hunter-gatherer in the sample. Of course, the choice ρ =1 is arbitrary, and 
I shall exploit the interpretation of this variable in calibrating the results of the model. In fact, I settle 
on a value of ρ =1.2.  
 In solving for model parameters, it is also necessary to enact additional restrictions. As the 
restrictions I place on the coefficients are arbitrary, I enact the restrictions with an eye towards easing 
the interpretation of each coefficient. Recall equation (21), which posited the relationship between 
total factor productivity, resources, and technology to be F H i A r
i i
i i , , = =
σ µ θ . A first restriction 
that I enact is:  
F H i i i , , 1 = = +σ µ .         ( 3 8 )  
The restriction that the coefficients in the expression for TFP add up to one allows one to 
interpret the values of µ  and σ  as the shares of the resource base and technology in total factor 
productivity for each mode of production.








γ ,         ( 3 9 )  
Equation (39) means that the sum of all exponents in the resource index is equal to one. The 
form of (39) implies that one can interpret the reduced form coefficients  ik γ  as measuring the share 
contribution of each environmental factor to overall environmental productivity.
36  
In addition to restrictions on the relationship between parameters, normalization decisions 
must be made. For the population density equations in (37), a decision must be made about whether to 
attribute the constant term to smaller costs of having children (as measured by b ), or exogenous 
features of the environment (as measured by  Fr Hr k k , ). I choose to set 1 = b . This normalization 
                                                 
35 Note that while these sorts of share restrictions are common in growth models, in this context the assumption 
is not as natural as it is in the typical growth model, where the sum of coefficients assumption follows directly 
from the application of national income data and constant returns to scale production.  
36 I opt to use absolute values in (39), which is the same as redefining the variables with negative coefficients 
(such as land slope in the hunter-gatherer equation) in terms of their inverses. effectively pins down the units in the production function as the output necessary to support the 
growth of one individual to adulthood; that is, whenever an individual is capable of producing more 
than one unit of output, there is some population growth. This normalization decision, coupled with 
the restrictions (38) and (39), allow solution of population density equations for model parameters.  
For the technology equations in (37), a choice must be made as to whether to attribute the 
constant term in the technology equation to a larger exogenous capacity to produce technological 
developments (as measured by a larger  iA k ), or a smaller vintage effect (as captured by a  i δ ). I 
choose to set 1 = iA δ . The technology equations (37) pose other challenges, the first of which is that 
the posited endogenous growth model in (24) does not fit the evidence presented in table 6 for the 
hunter-gatherer case, which suggests that the coefficients on population ( H η ), spillovers  ( H ε ,  H ε′ , 
and  H υ ) , and current technology ( H φ ) bear no influence in determining future levels of the 
technological scale variable; in short, the empirical results suggest that technological progress is 
exogenous. I therefore revise the technological progress equation for hunter-gatherers as follows, also 
using the assumption that  1 = AH δ :  
t H t A k A − = ∆ .        ( 4 0 )    
Equation (40) is a simple way of capturing the idea that tends exogenously towards a steady-
state value, so that  HA H k A = . For agricultural societies, while table 6 suggests that some coefficients 
are equal to zero, namely, those associated with technological spillovers from other hearths and due to 
time-separation ( F ε′  and  F υ ), there remains the issue as to a suitable restriction on the remaining 
coefficients  F φ ,  F ε , and  F η . I postulate that  
1 = + F F η ε .            ( 4 1 )  
Equation (41) is arbitrary but allows one to assess the relative contributions of spillovers and 
endogenous growth effects in generating technological sophistication.  The restrictions (38-41) leave two free parameters: c, which measures the time costs of 
enclosing a parcel of land,
37 and ρ , which renders an interpretation for the technological scale 
variable, A. Together, the free parameters ρ  and c leave enough room piece together the correct 
form of the phase diagrams described as figures 3 and 4. If one were to increase the observed level of 
technology  A by a factor ρ  in the regression equations, the result would be to 1) decrease the 
coefficient of technology in the population regression by a factor of  ρ / 1 , and 2) increase all 
coefficients (including the constant) in the technology regression by a factor of ρ ; keeping this in 
mind, I solve for the model’s reduced form parameters as functions of the unknown parameter ρ . 
The results are summarized on table 7. Through experimentation with the implied form of the phase 
diagrams displayed on figures 3 and 4, and the geographic distribution of the data set and the 
incidence and position of those societies switching to agriculture (see map 1), I arrived at a choice of 
ρ =1.2 and  2 = c . The resulting value for ρ =1.2 implies that the true level of technologoical 
sophistication for each society is 
A e A
2 . 1 ~
= , while  2 = c  implies that, for each unit of time devoted to 
actual agricultural production,  2 / 1 / 1 = c  a unit of time must be devoted to enforcing property rights 
over land. In the case in which the parameter estimate depends upon ρ , the estimate of the parameter 
assuming ρ =1.2 is also presented.  
The parameter values on table 7 imply some interesting things about the nature of spillovers, 
endogenous technological progress, and the resource base. For example,  59 . = F ε  and  41 . = F η  
imply that approximately 59% of the observed technological sophistication of agricultural societies is 
due to spillovers, while approximately 41% of technological sophistication is due to feedback from 
population density into technological progress. The estimates  09 . = F σ  and  91 . = F µ  imply that 
about 91% of total factor productivity in agriculture is due to differences in resource endowments, 
                                                 
37 Recall that  c / 1  measures the per unit time costs of enclosing land – this parameter was lost in the log-
linearization of the model. while about 9% is due to differences in technological sophistication. The estimates  74 . = F α  and 
82 . = H α  give estimates of the factor share of land in each mode of production; they imply that, 
other things equal, hunting and gathering is (slightly) more labor intensive than farming, but that both 
modes of production are fairly land-intensive. Holding technology constant, these estimates also 
describe the elasticity of output per person with respect to population density; which is -.26 for 
agricultural societies, and -.18 for hunter-gatherer societies.
38  
It is perhaps best to assess these assumptions in terms of what they imply about the switch to 
agriculture, and what they imply about the nature of this transition. Figure 5 displays two phase 
portraits resulting from calibration of the model using parameter values from table 7; the upper 
portion of the figure uses the environmental information from the Aztec society (number 153 on map 
1), while the lower portion of the figure uses environmental information from the Mbuti of the Ituri 
rainforest (number 13 on map 1). In both parts of figure 5, I set distance from the Fertile Crescent to 
be d=8000 to minimize the impact of spillovers. 
The pictures are best thought of as the result of a hypothetical thought experiment about what 
the transition might look like if one were to position an isolated Paleolithic band in a region 
characterized by the Aztec or Mbuti environmental conditions. On both of the diagrams, the lack of 
relationship between population and technology results in a vertical population isocline and a 
horizontal technology isocline when societies are engaged in hunting and gathering. The convex 
dashed line on each figure is the switching constraint (26), while the vertical dashed line on the upper 
portion of the figure is the population density at which the Aztec society switched fully to agriculture.  
For the upper half of the picture, the model parameters imply that the hunter-gatherer phase of society 
implies population densities slightly less than one person per square mile, and a level of technological 
sophistication somewhere around 6 times that of the typical Neolithic society. At a population density 
of approximately 1 person per square mile, agriculture begins, and this sets off increasing 
                                                 
38 One can show that the elasticity of output per person, holding technology constant is given by  1 − α . This is 
an approximate value for agricultural societies.  technological sophistication; when population density reaches approximately 2.1 persons per square 
mile, the population is fully engaged in agriculture, while population growth and technological 
progress continue until population density reaches a steady-state of about 9.5 persons per square mile, 
and steady-state level of technological sophistication approximately 55 times that of the typical 
Paleolithic society. By contrast, the lower part of figure 5 shows a situation in which the society never 
reaches the transition point, and remains at the hunter-gatherer population density and level of 
technological sophistication – 1 person per square mile and a level of technological sophistication 
about 6 times that of a typical Paleolithic hunter-gatherer society.  
Map 2 presents the result of a more comprehensive thought experiment using the parameter 
estimates. This map shows those societies that would have switched to agriculture given model 
parameters, assuming no spillovers (d=8000) from the Fertile Crescent. Those societies that would 
have independently switched to agriculture are marked with asterisks under my modeling 
assumptions (missing values are marked with m’s), where I have retained the markers from map 1 
indicating whether or not the society is agricultural or hunter-gatherer.
39 One notes from this picture 
that expected centers of agriculture include Central America, the western coast of Africa, southeast 
Asia, parts of Indonesia, and the Eastern United States – all of which have been hypothesized as 
initial or secondary centers of agriculture. The model also generates some predictions which do not 
jibe with the archaeological record: no societies in the Fertile Crescent switch to agriculture, while 
societies on the Northwest Coast of America, in Europe, and in more isolated locations such as 
Northern Australia would independently switch to agriculture. The lack of agriculture in the Fertile 
Crescent and its presence in Europe is perhaps explained by the considerable change in climate that 
has occurred over the past 10000 years in these areas; over this time period, Europe has become more 
amenable to agriculture, while the Fertile Crescent has become less amenable to agriculture.  
                                                 
39 One might wonder if it is possible to manipulate the parameters c and ρ  to get a more realistic picture of the 
switch to agriculture. While one might get more or less societies to switch in this way, generally, the 
geographical distribution of the center of agriculture do not change.  The more difficult cases to explain are those of the North American Pacific Northwest Coast, 
and the model echoes the critique(s) of Pryor (1983,6): why some societies never apparently switched 
to agriculture (the Tiwi of northern Australia, number 90, also reflect this concern). The picture 
presented here suggests that the best interpretation of the data is: if one were to position hunter-
gatherers all over the modern world, where would one expect agriculture originate independently? 
 
V.  Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to design and estimate a representative model of the 
origins of agriculture, and explore the quantitative nature of the origins of agriculture using data on 
the incidence of agriculture among a more recent sample of indigenous cultures. In some sense, one 
might view this paper as the economic counterpart to the work described in Cavalli-Sforza and 
Cavalli-Sforza (1996), which argues that maps constructed using modern genetic data still bear strong 
traces of the spread of agriculture, and the work described in Ruhlen (1995), which describes similar 
results using linguistic maps.     
The model performs reasonably well and generates a quantitative picture as to how 
technological progress, population growth, and the transition to agriculture might have occurred. One 
finding is that the environmental factors that explain population density among hunter-gatherers (for 
example, greater habitat diversity, relatively high rainfall, and a flatter landscape) are different than 
those that predict population density among agricultural society (soil and climate quality for 
agriculture, nearness to an ocean). The model also yields reasonable estimates of the degree to which 
spillovers and endogenous growth effects are important in technology for agricultural societies, and 
even yields estimates as to how one might rate the technological sophistication of societies, and how 
one might quantify the ultimate gain in technological sophistication due to the transition to 
agriculture. The model also finds strong evidence for the importance of endogenous growth effects 
(feedback between population density and technological progress), and the acceleration of these effects with the switch to agriculture. One remaining mystery is why some societies which apparently 
occupy regions fairly amenable to agriculture never made a switch to agriculture.   
While this paper has presented estimates for some of the base parameters of a growth model 
with a transition to agriculture, because of the focus on steady-state relationships, it has avoided not 
incorporating explicit information on dynamics, and the time frame within which a switch to 
agriculture might occur. It has also not explored the connection with other models of long-run 
demographic and technological change, such as those that postulate growth from a Malthusian-type 
growth regime towards more modern growth regimes, as discussed in Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), 
and Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy (1999).  These issues constitute important avenues for future 
research.   It is reasonable to say that most of the basic theoretical reasons underlying the transition to 
agriculture are by this point fairly well-developed across multiple disciplines. It is hoped that the 
research in this paper will help in propelling this literature towards a debate about how to better 
estimate and calibrate models of the transition to agriculture, and other models of growth in the very-
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Figure 1: Marginal product of agriculture and enclosure effort, and average product of hunting and 
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 Table 1: Description of Variables and Sources used in the analysis 





Agriculture to food 
supply 
=1 if none, =2 if only non-food crops, =3 if <10%,  
=4 if <50% single source, =5 if > 50% single source,  
=6 if primarily agricultural. 
SCCS 
Agriculture in use?   =1 if Contribution of Agriculture to food supply >3 
=0 otherwise 
SCCS 
Population Density  =0 if < 1 persons per square mile, =1 if 1-5 persons per 




=0 if no specialization present, =1 if pottery only,  
=2 if loom weaving only, =3 if metalwork only,  




=0 none, =1 Mnemonic devices, =2 Non-written records, 




   
Mean Rainfall  Mean yearly rainfall (cm)  Cashdan (2003) 
High Rainfall?  =1 if mean yearly rainfall is more than 1 standard 
deviation above SCCS mean yearly rainfall 
 
CV Rainfall  Coefficient of variation in mean yearly rainfall  Cashdan (2003) 
Climate suitability 
for agriculture  
Scale ranging from 0 (impossible) to 4 (very good) 
developed by Pryor using FAO/UNESCO reports 
Pryor (1986) 
Soil suitability for 
agriculture 
Scale ranging from 0 (impossible) to 4 (very good) 
developed by Pryor using FAO/UNESCO  
Pryor (1986) 
Land slope  Scale ranging from 0 to 4 developed by Pryor  Pryor (1986) 
No. habitats w/in 
200 miles 
Based on counting the number of vegetation types, ocean 
and lake presence within 200 mile diameter 
Cashdan (2003) 
Ocean w/in 200 mi?  =1 if the society is within 200 miles of an ocean  Cashdan (2003) 
Lake w/in 100 mi?  =1 if the society is within 100 miles of a major lake  Cashdan (2003) 
Number of frost 
months per year 
Number of frost months per year   SCCS 
Primary Production  Cubic meters of plant production per year, calculated 
using Kelly (1995) and UNESCO (1976).  
 
Geography/Time    
Distance from fertile 
crescent 
Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the 
fertile crescent at 45E, 35N (.786, .611 in radians) 
 
Closer to another 
hearth?  
=1 if closest to another original hearth of agriculture 





Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the 
Northeastern U. S. at , Central America at, South China at 
 








































 Table 3: means of selected variables compiled from the standard cross cultural sample (Murdock and 

















































































Number habitats w/in 



















































































**    Difference in means significant at 5% 





Table 4: Equilibrium effort levels and payoffs in the static model 
Population density range
H τ F τ E τ Food production per capita 
F H x x +  
*
1 p p ≤  
 
















1 p p p < <  
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α α α α φ
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 Table 5: Probit Model of incidence of agricultural use among SCCS societies. 
Dependent variable = Agriculture in use? 
 
Independent variable   Estimated 
coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Ln(1+Ocean within 200 miles)   0.03 
(0.41) 

























Ln(Primary Production)  0.41
 
(.27) 
Ln(Land Slope)  -0.19 
(0.68) 
Ln(1+Number of Frost Months)  -.41
*** 
(0.16) 
Ln(Distance from Fertile Crescent) 
 
Closest to another hearth * 
















*     significant at 10% 
**   significant at 5% 























Pop. Density equation         







































































































































2  0.43  0.28 0.32 0.59  0.51 
         
Technology equation         



























































2  0.42  0.36 0.36 0.05  0.00 
*     significant at 10% 
**   significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
  Table 7: Reduced form model parameters, solved using restrictions described in text and estimates on 
table 6.  
 
Parameter Description  Hunter/Gatherer 
Value 
Agriculture Value 
α   Factor share of labor in 
production  







ρ  (.74) 
µ   Resource share of total factor 
productivity 
1 
  39 355
355
+ ρ
ρ  (.91) 







η   Contribution of population 
density to technological progress 
0 .41 
φ   Contribution of past technology 




1−  (.54) 
ε   Contribution of distance from 
fertile crescent (1/dist) 
0 .59 
r k   Constant term in population 
equation 
.43 0.60 
A k   Constant term in technology 
equation 
ρ 52 . 1 e  (6.19)  499.84 
nh γ   Contribution of habitat diversity 
to resource base 
.11 0 
hr γ   Contribution of high rainfall to 
resource base (1/hr for ag.) 
.41 .22 
cv γ   Contribution of variability in 
rainfall to resource base  
.18 0 
pp γ   Contribution of primary 
production to resource base 
.06 0 
fm γ   Contribution of frost months to 
resource base 
.05 0 
ls γ   Contribution of land slope (1/ls) 
to resource base 
.19 0 
cs γ   Contribution of climate 
suitability for agriculture to 
resource base 
0 0.20 
ss γ   Contribution of soil suitability 
for agriculture to resource base 
0 0.24 
oc γ   Contribution of ocean proximity 
to resource base 
0 0.34  
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